THE COURTS AND SLAVERY. 109
ance, as in writing of the celebrated case in Fredericton in 'Soo to Chief-justice Blowers he remarks. "The principal difficulty on that side seemed to be the not finding any Act of Assembly of your province recognizing the existence of slavery there. Had the counsel ]for the master] stumbled upon your Act passed in 1762, p. 117 of your laws as revised in 1783. in the second section of which Negro slaves are mentioned, the conclusiveness of the reasoning upon their principles would have been considered as demonstrated". " The expression you mention of ' Negro slaves' ", said Mr. Blowers in reply, " in our province law for regulating inn-holders, etc., has been considered here as merely a description of a class of people existing in the province, and not as a recognition of the law of slavery. When the law made in 1787 for the regulating of servants was brought into the House of Assembly, there was a clause inserted for the government of Negro slaves which was rejected by a great majority on the ground that slavery did not exist in this province and ought not to be mentioned, and that the expression in the inn-holder's law was the description of a class of people whose condition was the effect of imposition or mutual consent between the parties".
To Mr. Aplin's contention that the English Acts which made Negroes in the Rest Indies the personal property of their masters made Negroes such here, the English authorities consulted gave an unqualified approval, the attorney-general of England and Mr. Percival pronouncing the " legal inference drawn by him to be "quite irresistible and unanswerable". The third legal authority, Mr. Tidd, " reputed to be the most learned special pleader" in England, gave as his opinion that the plaintiff was not merely "entitled to the services of his slave" but to "some-thing more, namely to the property in him and right of disposing of him", and that upon that ground "an action